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One goal of extending the duration of unemployment insurance (UI) in recessions is to increase UI
coverage in the face of longer unemployment spells. Although it is a common concern that such extensions
may themselves raise nonemployment durations, it is not known how recessions would affect the magnitude
of this moral hazard. To obtain causal estimates of the differential effects of UI in booms and recessions,
this paper exploits the fact that, in Germany, potential UI benefit duration is a function of exact age
which is itself invariant over the business cycle. We implement a regression discontinuity design separately
for twenty years and correlate our estimates with measures of the business cycle. We find that the
nonemployment effects of a month of additional UI benefits are, at best, somewhat declining in recessions.
Yet, the UI exhaustion rate, and therefore the additional coverage provided by UI extensions, rises
substantially during a downturn. The ratio of these two effects represents the nonemployment response
of workers weighted by the probability of being affected by UI extensions. Hence, our results imply
that the effective moral hazard effect of UI extensions is significantly lower in recessions than in booms.
Using a model of job search with liquidity constraints, we also find that, in the absence of market-wide
effects, the net social benefits from UI extensions can be expressed either directly in terms of the exhaustion
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Providing unemployment insurance (UI) beneﬁts is one of the most common policy tools to ease
the hardship of job losers in recessions. Despite the widespread existence of UI systems, there is
remarkable heterogeneity across countries in how these systems react to the business cycle. While
in most countries, including Germany, potential UI beneﬁt durations are constant over the business
cycle, in others, particularly the United States, potential UI durations are regularly extended dur-
ing recessions. Whether or not such countercyclical potential UI durations are socially beneﬁcial
is highly debated among economists (e.g. Needels and Nicholson 2004). One justiﬁcation for in-
creases in UI durations is that, absent the extensions, a large fraction of recipients would exhaust
beneﬁts and experience signiﬁcant declines in consumption (Gruber 1997, Browning and Crossley
2001, Congressional Budget Ofﬁce 2004). However, a long literature suggests that extensions in
UI durations entail a cost in terms of a reduction in individuals’ labor supply (Solon 1979, Mofﬁtt
1985, Katz and Meyer 1990, Meyer 1990, Hunt 1995). As of now, there is no clear consensus how
this disincentive effect changes during recessions. Some observers have argued that it is larger
during a downturn (Ljungqvist and Sargent 1998, 2008) while others have suggested that it may
instead be smaller (Krueger and Meyer 2002).1
Identifying the changing effect of UI extensions over the business cycle is difﬁcult in a setting
where UI extensions are endogenous to the state of the labor market.2 To circumvent this problem,
in this paper we provide new estimates of the variation of the effect of UI durations on nonemploy-
ment and beneﬁt durations over the business cycle using a regression discontinuity (RD) design
1The intuition for the view of stronger disincentive effects is that the incidence and cost of job loss is particularly
severe in a recession (von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2009). In this case the effective replacement rate may rise
beyond the typical replacement rate and imply stronger and possibly lasting effects on unemployment as in Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998, 2008). On the other hand, higher costs of job search may reduce the effect of UI parameters on
labor supply and on the aggregate unemployment rate in recessions.
2In the United States, the trigger-based state-level extended beneﬁts (EB) can be used together with the timing of
discretionary federal temporary emergency unemployment compensation (EUC) to identify the effect of unemploy-
ment insurance duration on nonemployment. Rothstein (2011) exploits this stragegy to evaluate the effect of EB and
EUC during the 2008 recession, and ﬁnds signiﬁcantly negative but moderate effects. Card and Levine (2000) exam-
ine the effects of an extension in UI unrelated to local unemployment conditions in New Jersey, and also ﬁnd more
moderate effects on employment than previous studies based on EB and EUC in the 1970s and 1980s.
1and data from Germany. Our strategy exploits the fact that the German UI system implies large
differences in the potential duration of UI beneﬁts by exact age of the UI claimant. This policy is
invariant to the business cycle and hence allows us to circumvent the endogeneity problem. Using
day-to-day administrative data on the universe of unemployment spells and ensuing employment
outcomes for mature workers in Germany from the mid-1980s to 2008, we implement the RD
approach by year and by industry, and correlate our estimates with indicators of the business cycle.
To help clarify the potential implications of our results for the welfare effect of UI extensions
over the business cycle, we use a search model with endogenous search intensity and liquidity
constraints (e.g., Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007a, Chetty 2008). From this model, we derive a
formula that directly relates the welfare gains of UI extensions over the business cycle to increases
in the UI exhaustion rate, and the welfare costs to the effect of potential UI durations on nonem-
ployment and program duration. As in the related literature (e.g., Kiley 2003, Sanchez 2008), our
formula implies that optimal potential UI durations vary inversely with a summary measure of the
disincentive effect of UI extensions: the ratio of the effects of UI extensions on nonemployment
duration and UI beneﬁt duration. This measure implicitly controls for changes in the number of
individuals ’at risk’ of exhausting beneﬁts who are most affected by UI extensions, and is thus
ideal for comparing changes in the disincentive effects over the business cycle.
We begin by using our RD strategy to obtain labor supply effects with respect to potential UI
durations for large differential expansions for mature workers with stable labor force attachment.
Our estimates imply a moderate rise in nonemployment of about 0.1 months for each additional
month of potential UI beneﬁt duration. This is robust across a number of alternative speciﬁca-
tions. Furthermore, these effects on labor supply are similar for different increases in UI duration,
similar across demographic groups, similar for workers with weaker labor force attachment, and
somewhat larger for workers unlikely to take up extended unemployment assistance after exhaust-
ing UI beneﬁts.
Our analysis of variation over the business cycle points to moderate, and for the most part
statistically insigniﬁcant declines in the effects of a one-month increase in potential UI durations
2on nonemployment durations in large recessions. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that the effect of
UI extensions on beneﬁt durations, and thus the additional coverage provided by UI, increases
signiﬁcantly in recessions, mainly due to a rise in the UI exhaustion rate. The ratio of the two
estimates – which is our summary measure of the disincentive effect of UI beneﬁts that implicitly
controls for changes in the probability of being affected by the extensions over the business cycle –
is clearly countercyclical. The ratio indicates that, for each additional month in actual UI durations,
the response of labor supply to UI extensions falls signiﬁcantly in recessions. These results are
robust to considering variation by year or year-by-industry, the use of alternative measures of the
business cycle, holding characteristics of UI claimants constant, including workers with weaker
labor-force attachment, and an extensive robustness analysis.
By using regression discontinuity estimates in different economic regimes to assess whether
the duration of UI has stronger or weaker employment effects in booms and recessions and by
explicitly analyzing the effects on beneﬁt durations and exhaustion rates, the paper complements
an earlier literature on cyclical effects of UI durations (Mofﬁtt 1985, Jurajda and Tannery 2003)
and related recent work on UI beneﬁt levels using state-level differences in unemployment and UI
parameters in the United States (Kroft and Notowidigdo 2010). Our estimates also add to existing
studies of the labor supply effects of UI durations by combining large increases in UI durations
and a large number of years and observations with a sharp regression discontinuity design (Meyer
1990, Katz and Meyer 1990, Hunt 1995, Lalive 2008, Rothstein 2011). In contrast to studies using
region or time variation in UI durations, our RD design allows us to identify changes in the actual
behavioral response, while holding constant any market-level factors that may change over time or
across regions.
The paper is also related to the literature concerned with the welfare implications of parameters
of the current unemployment insurance system. By deriving the welfare effects of extensions in
the duration of UI beneﬁts, we extend the existing literature focused on UI beneﬁt levels (Baily
1978, Kiley 2003, Shimer and Werning 2007, Chetty 2008, Sanchez 2008, Kroft and Notowidigdo
2010). Our formula therefore also clariﬁes existing ’rules of thumb’ regarding the optimal exten-
3sion of UI beneﬁts. According to our formula, the duration of UI should neither only be extended
until the exhaustion rate is constant (Corson and Nicholson 1982), nor only extended to hold the
nonemployment effect of UI constant (Mofﬁtt 1985). Rather, setting optimal potential UI du-
rations should take into account both factors and set durations according to the effective moral
hazard parameter we propose. Since the welfare formula depends on the actual nonemployment
and beneﬁt response to UI durations inﬂuenced by market-level factors which our estimates hold
constant (Landais, Michaillat, and Saez 2010), we do not derive direct welfare implications from
our results.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we derive the welfare effect of extensions
in UI beneﬁts. Section III describes the institutional environment in Germany, the administrative
data, and our empirical approach. Sections IV and V contain our main ﬁndings regarding the effect
of extended UI on labor supply and beneﬁt duration over the business cycle. Section VI concludes,
relating our empirical ﬁndings to a theoretical welfare formula, and providing suggestions for
future research.
II THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF UI EXTENSIONS IN A SEARCH MODEL
In this section, we use a model of job search with endogenous search intensity and liquidity con-
straints (Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007a; Chetty 2008) to show that the welfare costs of UI beneﬁt
extensions rise with the adverse labor supply effect of UI durations, while the welfare beneﬁts rise
with the exhaustion rate of UI beneﬁts. We then show that, as in the literature on optimal beneﬁt
levels, the welfare effect of UI extensions can be written as a function of a single parameter cap-
turing individuals’ labor supply responses to UI extensions. Here, we only state the main results of
the model and their intuition, relegating derivations and further discussions to the Web Appendix.
Worker’s Problem. The model describes optimal behavior of a worker living T discrete periods
(e.g., months) who is unemployed and receiving UI beneﬁts in period t = 0. In each period, the
worker decides how intensely to search for a job. Let st denote search intensity, which is normal-
ized to the probability of ﬁnding a job. Employment is an absorbing state and, when employed,
4a worker receives a wage of wt and pays a tax of t, which is used exclusively to ﬁnance unem-
ployment insurance beneﬁts. Furthermore, in each period the worker owns assets At, the level of
which is constrained by a lower bound. As in Chetty (2008), in our baseline case we assume that
the wage a worker can receive is ﬁxed (such that there is no role for reservation wages), the initial
asset level A0 is ﬁxed, and there is no heterogeneity. Relaxing these assumptions does not affect
our main conclusions (see the Web Appendix).
While unemployed, the worker receives a ﬁxed level of UI beneﬁts b < wt for, at most, a ﬁxed
number of P periods. During this period, the worker’s ﬂow utility function of consumption is
denoted by u(cu
t ), which can differ from the utility function of consumption during employment,
v(ce
t). After exhausting UI beneﬁts, the worker receives a ﬁxed baseline utility and no further
transfer payments (though this assumption is easily relaxed). The total duration of nonemployment
is Då
T 1
t=0 St, where St Õ
t
j=0(1 sj) is the survivor function at timet. Total lifetime of workers
at the time of entering unemployment is thus broken up into three periods: a period of receiving
UI beneﬁts (B  å
P 1
t=0 St), a period of nonemployment without receiving UI beneﬁts (D B), and
a period of employment (T  D).
Welfare Effect of UI Extensions. Assuming the social planner sets taxes to achieve a balanced
budget of the UI system and that workers respond optimally to incentives, we can derive the effects
of changes in the potential duration of UI beneﬁts P on welfare.3 Social welfare at time t = 0 is
given as W0, the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed worker.4 The budget constraint of
the social planner requires t = B
T D b. After some algebra, we obtain our ﬁrst main result. The
marginal welfare gain of increasing P is
3The solution of the worker’s decision problem follows standard principles of dynamic optimization. We follow
the existing applied literature on the optimality of the UI system by focusing on a constraint optimization within the
class of typical UI systems (e.g., Baily 1978, Chetty 2008). A large theoretical literature has derived the full optimal
time-path of UI beneﬁts (e.g., Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997, Shimer and Werning 2007, Pavoni 2007).
4Focusing on the welfare of a worker who just lost his job loses no generality. Alternatively, one can assume that,
at t=0, only a fraction of individuals are unemployed. In this case, social welfare,W0, represents the expected average
utility of the employed and the unemployed. While this makes the exposition more notationally heavy, it does not
affect the welfare results (see Web Appendix for more details). To analyze marginal changes in P, we need to assume
that P can be increased by a fraction of 1 (a month in our case), and that, if P is not an integer number, it means a





































dP is the increase in beneﬁt
duration due to reduced search intensity among unemployed individuals before the exhaustion
point. dD
dP is the increase in the total nonemployment duration in response to a rise in potential UI








The ﬁrst term in this expression states that the marginal welfare beneﬁt (per person) of ex-
tending UI beneﬁts is the transfer, ﬁnanced by taxes, of consumption from the employed to the






. This term is pos-
itive as long as the marginal utility of consumption of the unemployed in period P, u0(cu
P), is
higher than the expected marginal utility of consumption of the employed, E0;T 1v0(ce
t). If the two
marginal utilities are equal, then there is no rationale for unemployment insurance. In the model
here, this would be the case if the individual is not liquidity constrained.
The second term captures the costs of extending UI beneﬁts due to the behavioral change
induced by the more generous UI system. This cost is the per capita increase in taxes levied upon
employed individuals multiplied by their marginal utility. Taxes rise because the unemployed







also increase because longer nonemployment durations reduce the number of periods in which





Empirical Implementation. Potential UI durations are at an optimum if dW0
dP = 0. While solving
the model laid out here for the optimal UI durations would require estimating a full structural
model - beyond the scope of this paper - equation (1) provides a framework to analyze under what
circumstances the welfare beneﬁts of UI extensions are likely to vary over the business cycle. For
any given change in UI duration P, the welfare effect potentially varies over the business cycle
with different components of the formula.
The beneﬁt levels b are, apart from changes in the sample composition(which we control for),
unchanged over the business cycle. As long as the government smooths taxes over the business
6cycle, whichisapproximatelythecaseinmostcountries, thewelfarecostofdecreasingthetaxbase
by one worker-month ( B
T Db multiplied by the average marginal utility of the employed individual
who is taxed, E0;T 1v0(ce
t)), can be considered ﬁxed from a welfare perspective.5 The components
that potentially vary over the business cycle are the increase in nonemployment durations (dD
dP), the






2) and the marginal utility of an unemployed individual
at the exhaustion point (u0(cu
P)). As further discussed in Section IV.B, changes in the latter can
arise if liquidity – and hence the ability to self-insure – varies over the cycle.








2. One source of variation is changes in individual incentives affecting search intensity (the
partial-equilibrium or micro effect of UI extensions). In the working paper version of this paper,
we showed that an increase in search costs in recessions, due, for example, to a decline in job-offer
arrivalrates, reduces dD
dP. Ontheotherhand, adeclineinreemploymentwages, possiblyduetoreal-
location in recessions, would tend to increase dD
dP. The effective exit rate from nonemployment, and
hence nonemployment duration, will also be affected by cyclical variation in market-wide factors,
such as congestion effects, vacancy rates, or the take-up of UI beneﬁts (the general-equilibrium or
macro effect). In our empirical application, we will control for market-level variation, and hence
will identify variation in nonemployment duration due mainly to differences in incentives. In Sec-
tion IV and the Conclusion, we discuss under what circumstances this is sufﬁcient to sign the
change in the welfare effect of UI extensions over the business cycle.
Approximate Formula. Since our data allows us to obtain estimates of the effect of UI exten-
sions on the full survivor function, in our empirical analysis we will measure the three relevant
marginal effects separately. However, we ﬁnd that the cyclical variation of the exhaustion rate,
5To be more precise, the marginal utility of employed individuals who are affected by a marginal increase in taxes
can be considered constant as long as the government chooses an optimal tax policy that levies additional taxes in
periods when the costs of taxation are lowest, rather than balancing the budget every period (e.g., Andersen and Svarer
2010). In practice, there appears to be considerable smoothing of UI taxes over the business cycle. For example, in
Germany, payroll taxes used to ﬁnance UI beneﬁts do not vary with the business cycle. Similarly, in the United States,
the states’ UI trust funds run deﬁcits in recessions. Such smoothing, rather than levying high taxes in recessions when
UI expenditures are high, would be optimal as long as the marginal utility of the employed is approximately constant
over the cycle. Compared to large earning losses in recessions for job losers, the ﬂuctuations in earning trajectories,





1, is the main contributor to the variation in dB




the shift in the survivor function before the exhaustion point and thus has nearly the same cyclical
variation as dD
dP, while at the same time having very little impact on the variation in dB
dP . Thus, in the
discussion of our main results, we will focus on the properties of dB
dP and dD
dP. In fact, for the case of













Furthermore, in this case, the welfare effect of extensions in potential UI durations indeed depends
only on the two parameters dB
dP and dD
















where W  xu0(cu
P)+ B
T DE0;T 1v0(ce
t) > 0. This formula indexes the welfare gain by the effect of




, and the welfare cost by the disincentive




. Again, the main source of variation over the business
cycle in this formula should be the employment and beneﬁt effects of UI extensions. Even though
the hazard in our sample is declining somewhat over the nonemployment spell, in simulations we
found that the alternative welfare formula in equation (2) approximates the exact welfare formula
in equation (1) quite well. The approximation is likely to work even better in settings such as the
United States, where the hazard has been shown to be close to constant (Katz and Meyer 1990).
Rescaled Formula. To determine whether optimal UI duration should change in a recession,
the approach so far requires separately measuring the effect of UI extensions on nonemployment
and beneﬁt duration. To express the formula in terms of a single statistic capturing the role of
disincentive effects, we can rescale the formula by the effect of UI extensions on actual beneﬁt
duration multiplied by the beneﬁt level (dB
dP b). The term dB
dP b measures how many additional
dollars of UI beneﬁts are paid for an additional month of potential UI durations. Dividing dW0
dP by
dB
dP b thus yields the marginal welfare gain (in dollars) from spending one additional dollar on UI



























: This equation captures the welfare gain in dollars from an extension of UI ben-
eﬁts relative to the additional dollar amount of expenditures on UI. The key new parameter in
this equation is the ratio of the effect of UI extensions on nonemployment and actual beneﬁt du-
rations, which is the instrumental variable (IV) estimator of the effect of actual UI duration (B)
on nonemployment duration (D), using the maximum potential beneﬁt duration (P) as instrument.
This interpretation is appealing for several reasons. First, this estimator effectively rescales the
marginal effect of the UI extension on nonemployment duration by the effective take-up of UI
beneﬁts due to UI extensions, and hence by the population ’at risk’ of being affected by the beneﬁt
extension. This implies that if dD
dP is constant over the business cycle, but dB
dP is increasing in reces-
sions, the effective behavioral response to UI durations is declining.6 Second, our welfare formula
in equation (3) is similar in spirit to those in Baily (1974) and Chetty (2008), which contain the
elasticity of nonemployment with respect to beneﬁt levels as a single measure of the disincentive
effect. Our measure of the disincentive effect, dD
dB, and the nonemployment duration elasticity with
respect to beneﬁt levels or durations, provide alternative normalizations for the number of individ-
uals ’at risk’. From this point of view, our measure is well-suited for comparisons of the effect of
UI over time since it more directly normalizes for changes in UI beneﬁt take-up. Hence, in parallel
to the prior literature, ceteris paribus, a decline in the disincentive effect as measured by the IV es-
timator implies a rise in optimal beneﬁt duration. Finally, a key advantage for our purposes is that
we can obtain an estimate of dD
dB for broader samples of workers, for whom, for reasons discussed
in Section III, we cannot obtain the rescaled marginal effects dB
dP and dD
dP separately. Therefore, we
6The IV estimator can be interpreted as a local average treatment effect (LATE), which is the weighted sum of the
effects of an increase in actual UI duration on nonemployment duration at each duration up to the maximum duration
P, weighted by the fraction of people whose beneﬁt take-up is affected by the UI extension. The weighting function is
the difference in the survivor functions in the case with and without beneﬁt extension up to the new maximum beneﬁt
duration (Angrist and Imbens 1995). If individuals were myopic and only responded by altering search intensity at
beneﬁt exhaustion, we would have dB
dP = SP. In this case, the IV estimator measures the effect of the beneﬁt extensions
on nonemployment durations for those exhausting beneﬁts and we would rescale the welfare formula by the exhaustion
rate times the beneﬁt level.
9will also report estimates of this ratio in our empirical analysis.
III INSTITUTIONS, DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Several aspects of the German UI system make it ideal for studying the costs and beneﬁts of UI
extensions over the business cycle. Discontinuities in eligibility based on exact age allow us to
estimate the effect of extensions in UI durations using a regression discontinuity (RD) design.
A particular advantage is that the discontinuities lead to large extensions in the duration of UI
at multiple age thresholds that are stable over long stretches of time, and thus do not depend on
the business cycle. The system also provides the necessary detailed, longitudinal data on UI and
employment spells for large samples needed to credibly implement the RD design over multiple
years.
III.A The Unemployment Insurance System in Germany
The German unemployment insurance system provides income replacement to eligible workers
who lose their job without fault. The replacement rate is ﬁxed, as is the duration of disbursement.
For an individual without children, the replacement rate is 63 percent of previous net earnings.7
From the 1980s onwards, the maximum duration of beneﬁts was tied to recipients’ exact age at
the beginning of the UI spell and their prior labor force history. It is this difference which we
exploit to estimate the effect of extensions in duration of UI beneﬁts on nonemployment durations.
Figure I shows the discontinuities in potential beneﬁt duration by age when claiming for the group
of workers who, given their employment histories, are entitled to the maximum durations in their
respective age group. Between July 1987 and March 1999, the potential UI duration for workers
who were younger than 42 was 12 months. For workers between 42 and 43, potential UI duration
7Workers become eligible to receive UI beneﬁts if they have worked for at least 12 months in the previous three
years. Workers who lose their jobs because of their own fault or quit are also eligible for UI beneﬁts after a waiting
period of 12 weeks which are subtracted from their potential UI durations. While exact data on the number of quits
among UI recipients are not available for our time period, our own calculations show a small spike of 3.5% of UI
take-up 85 days after the end of a job. UI sanctions for not taking suitable jobs exist but appear to be rarely enforced
(Wilke 2005). For individuals with children, the replacement rate is 68 percent. We provide more information on the
institutional details in the Web Appendix.
10increased to 18 months; for workers from 44 to 48 (49 to 53), the maximum duration further rose to
22 (26) months. As further explained below, in our main analysis, we restrict ourselves to workers
in this age range who qualify for the maximum potential durations to obtain precise measures of
potential UI durations. At the end of the 1990s, a reform occurred which was meant to reduce
potential disincentive effects of unemployment insurance. As shown in Figure I, starting in April
1999, the potential UI durations were lowered and the age thresholds were shifted upwards by
three years. Thus, in order to be eligible for 18 months or 22 months of beneﬁts, a worker had to
be at least 45 or 47 on the claiming date. We will use these alternative thresholds to validate our
main research design.8
Individuals who exhaust regular UI beneﬁts and whose net liquid wealth falls below a thresh-
old are eligible for unemployment assistance (UA), which does not have a limited duration. The
nominal replacement rate is 53 percent, but UA payments are reduced substantially by spousal
earnings and other sources of income. For example, for a woman whose husband earns as much
as 10 percent more than her, the UA beneﬁts are zero. Given that about 80 percent of individuals
in our cohort and age range are married, UA beneﬁts are, on average, about 35 percent for men
and 10 percent for women. Among all new UI spells in our sample, about 10 to15 percent end up
taking UA beneﬁts. We study the potential effect of UA on our ﬁndings in our empirical analysis.
III.B Social Security Data
The data for this paper is the universe of social security records in Germany. For each individual
working in Germany between 1975 and 2008, the data contains day-to-day longitudinal infor-
mation on every period of employment in a job covered by social security and every period of
receiving unemployment insurance beneﬁts, as well as corresponding wages and beneﬁt levels.
Compared to many other social security data sets, this data is very detailed. We observe several
8The reform was enacted in 1997 but phased in gradually, so that for people in the highest experience group, which
constitutes our analysis sample, it only took effect in April 1999 (See Arntz, Lo, and Wilke 2007). To avoid confusion,
we refer to this as the “1999-regime” in the text. In 2003 and 2004, the entire German social security system underwent
a comprehensive series of reforms (the Hartz reforms). We use the period between April 1999 and December 2004 as
a second sample period, thus excluding workers who became unemployed after the last Hartz reform took place.
11demographic characteristics, namely gender, education, birth date, nationality, place of residence
and work, as well as detailed job characteristics, such as average daily wage, occupation, industry,
and employer characteristics.9
To study the effect of extensions in potential UI durations, we created our analysis sample by
selecting all nonemployment spells in this data in the age range of 40 to 49. Given changes in
the institutional framework discussed in the previous section, we consider unemployment spells
starting any time between July 1987 and December 2004. This yields over 9 million individual
periods of unemployment. (Column 2 of Table A-1). For each period of nonemployment , we
created variables about the previous work history (such as job tenure, experience, wage, industry
and previous occupation), the duration of receipt of UI beneﬁts in days, the level of UI beneﬁts,
and information about the next job held after nonemployment.
Since we do not directly observe whether individuals are unemployed, we follow the previ-
ous literature and use length of nonemployment as a measure for unemployment durations (Card,
Chetty, and Weber 2007b). The duration of nonemployment is measured as the time between the
start of receiving UI beneﬁts and the date of the next registered employment spell. Since some
people take many years before returning to registered employment while others never do so, we
cap nonemployment durations at 36 months and set the duration of all longer spells at this cap.
This has the advantage of reducing the inﬂuence of outliers and avoiding censoring due to the end
of the observation period in 2008. Our results are robust to the exact choice of the cap.
The main ’treatment’ variable we are interested in is the potential duration of unemployment
insurance beneﬁts for any given nonemployment spell. To calculate potential UI duration for each
observation in our sample, we use information about the law in the relevant time periods together
with information on exact dates of birth and work histories. This yields precise measures for
workers who have been employed for a long continuous time and are eligible for the maximum
potential durations for their age groups. However, the calculation is not as clear cut for workers
9Individual workers can be followed using a unique person identiﬁer. Since about 80 percent of all jobs are within
the social security system (the main exceptions are self-employed, students, and government employees) this results
in nearly complete work histories for a majority of individuals.
12with intermittent unemployment spells because of complex carry-forward provisions in the law.
We thus deﬁne our core analysis sample to be all unemployment spells of workers who have been
working for at least 52 months of the last seven years and did not receive unemployment insurance
beneﬁts during that time period. This reduces our sample to about two million new UI spells
(Column 4 of Table A-1). Below, we show that our results are robust to broadening our sample to
include workers with weaker labor force attachment.
Statistics for various samples are shown in the Data Appendix to the paper. As expected,
relative to a general sample of nonemployment spells in Germany in the same age-range, the sam-
ple resulting from our restrictions on employment histories is more likely to be male, has higher
job tenure, and has higher earnings prior to nonemployment. As a result, wage losses upon re-
employment are larger and elapsed nonemployment spells are somewhat longer. Yet there is lit-
tle difference in educational attainment, nor are there strong differences in other post-UI career
outcomes. We conclude that while our main sample is not representative for the full sample of
nonemployment spells in Germany over this time period, it is likely to be typical of mature unem-
ployed workers who lost a job during a recession. In our Web Appendix (Table W-14), we also
show that the degree of job stability and other characteristics of our sample before unemployment
is comparable to UI recipients in the same age-range in the United States. Hence, our main sample
also bears similar features of UI populations of the same age-range studied in part of the prior
literature.
Elapsed duration in UI and nonemployment spells is large, but similar to what is found in
studies using comparable data. For example, in the Austrian case, the mean duration of nonem-
ployment or time between jobs for those reemployed by three years is similar (Card, Chetty, and
Weber 2007b). The average duration of spells is larger than what is typically found in the United
States. Yet, the differences are smaller where comparable data is available. This is found for
the duration of UI spells in Card and Levine (2000), or for nonemployment durations in the US
Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) we analyzed. In the DWS, among 40 to 49 year old displaced
workers who have received UI , about 15 percent are still not employed after three years, a ﬁgure
13comparable to Germany, where the fraction of individuals whose spell is censored at 36 months is
23 percent.10
III.C Methodology
The institutional structure and data allow us to estimate the causal effect of UI beneﬁt durations
on nonemployment duration and other outcomes using a regression discontinuity design. In a ﬁrst
step, we exploit the sharp age thresholds in eligibility rules for workers with previously high labor
force attachment in Germany to estimate the effect of large extensions in UI durations on labor
supply. We then replicate this approach for every year or year-by-industry in our sample, and
correlate it with indicators of the business cycle.
Throughout the paper, the analysis proceeds in two steps. We follow common practice and
show smoothed ﬁgures to visually examine discontinuities at the eligibility thresholds (Lee and
Lemieux 2010). To obtain estimates for the main causal effects, we follow standard regression
discontinuity methodology and estimate variants of the following regression model
yia = b0+b1Daa + f(a)+eia; (4)
where yia is an outcome variable, such as nonemployment duration, of an individual i of age a.
Daa is a dummy variable that indicates that an individual is above the age threshold a. For
our pooled estimates we focus on the longest period for which the UI system was stable, July
1987 - March 1999, and we use the three sharp thresholds at age 42, 44 and 49.11 We estimate
equation (4) locally around the three cutoffs and specify f(a) as a linear function while allowing
different slopes on both sides of the cutoff. In our main results we use a bandwidth of two years on
each side of the cutoff, but conﬁrm the robustness of our ﬁnding to using even smaller bandwidths.
We then replicate this approach for different years, industries, demographic groups, and outcomes.
10For more information regarding data construction and the comparison with the US, see the Web Appendix.
11There is a fourth discontinuity during this period at age 54. Since, at this age, early retirement becomes common
and various policies to facilitate early retirement interact with the UI system, we focus on younger workers in this
paper.
14All results are robust to an extensive sensitivity analysis summarized in Section V.
III.D Identiﬁcation Assumptions
The identiﬁcation assumption of the RD design requires that all factors other than the treatment
variable vary continuously at the age threshold. If this holds, then estimates for b1 can be inter-
preted as the causal effect of an increase in potential UI durations on the outcome variable, since
the ﬂexible continuous function f(a) captures the inﬂuence of all other factors. In our setting, both
the employer who lays off workers as well as the individual have some inﬂuence on the timing
of job loss and the claiming of unemployment beneﬁts. Our data allow us to investigate in de-
tail whether this leads to sorting around the eligibility cutoffs. The overall conclusion from this
analysis is that our labor supply effects represent valid regression discontinuity estimates.
One approach for assessing the identiﬁcation assumption is to test for discontinuities in observ-
able characteristics at the threshold by estimating equation (4) with observable characteristics as
outcome variables. Table I presents results of these regressions using two-year bandwidths around
the cutoffs. Of the 21 coefﬁcients in Table I, there are only two statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve
percent level. There is a statistically signiﬁcant increase in the fraction female at the 42-year and
49-year thresholds, however the magnitudes are still quite small. Examination of corresponding
regression discontinuity plots (shown in Web Appendix Figure W-1) conﬁrms the conclusion that
pre-determined characteristics change very little at the thresholds.
A second standard way of testing the RD assumption is to look at the smoothness of the density
of unemployment spells around the cutoffs. Figure II (a) shows the number of spells in two-week
age intervals. On average, there are around 4300 spells in each interval up until age 47, after which
the number of spells begins to decrease. It appears that at each cutoff there is a slight increase in the
density in the bin directly on the right of the cutoff. Implementing the test proposed by McCrary
(2008), this increase is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level for the 42-year and 49-year
cutoff but of very small magnitude.
Such an increase could either occur because workers wait until their birthday before claiming
15UI beneﬁts, because the probability of claiming UI rises with potential durations, or because ﬁrms
are more likely to lay off worker with higher potential UI durations. To see whether workers wait
before claiming UI until they are eligible for extended UI durations, column (1) of Table III below
shows how the time between job loss and ﬁrst take-up of UI beneﬁts varies around the threshold.
This provides no indication that people who claim UI to after the threshold have waited longer to
claim than the people who had claimed before it. This is consistent with the quite small change
in the density right around the cutoff we found. Only individuals relatively close to the age cutoff
have economic incentives to wait until after their birthday to claim beneﬁts. Taking into account
that an individual does not receive UI until claiming, if one ignores the possibility of receiving UA
after the end of UI and assumes zero discounting, one can show that the average individual (i.e., for
whom the survivor function of remaining in nonemployment is the same as the empirical survivor
function in the sample) could have an incentive to wait for up to 3.5 months. Taking UA beneﬁts
and discounting into account reduces these incentives. We show in the Web Appendix (Section
3.5) that the presence of UA beneﬁts approximately reduces the months worth waiting by half. In
combination with behavioral explanations, this may be the reason for the small amount of waiting
we observe. To directly assess the potential impact of waiting, we also re-estimated our models
after dropping UI spells with longer gaps between job ending and claiming (Web Appendix Table
W-4 and Table V). This had no effect on the results.
To assess whether ﬁrms selectively lay off workers eligible for higher beneﬁt durations, in
Figure II (b) we show the density of spells with respect to the dates the previous job ended. If
ﬁrms are more likely to lay off workers with higher UI beneﬁts, the discontinuity should appear
in this ﬁgure as well. Again there appear to be slight outliers immediately to the right of the 42-
year and 49-year cutoffs, but less clearly as in Figure II (a). If anything, this could indicate that
ﬁrms are waiting for a short time to lay off workers until they are eligible to higher UI beneﬁt
levels. However, it does not appear that ﬁrms are systematically more likely to lay off workers
with higher levels of UI beneﬁts, since, in such a case, the density would shift up permanently.
To ascertain that the small shift in the density of the age of layoff does not affect our results, we
16follow Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007a) and replicate our ﬁndings with new UI spells that originate
from employers experiencing multiple layoffs who hence have less scope for selectively laying off
workers (Web Appendix Tables W-16 and W-17). All our results are robust to this extension.
Overall, it appears that the discontinuity in the density is driven by, maximally, a few hundred
spells shifted to the right just around the cutoffs. This is relative to around 450,000 spells in each
of the four-year intervals. As an additional, conservative approach to assessing the impact of this
change in density, we calculated bounds on our coefﬁcients. For this purpose, we picked a number
of workers equal to the excess mass in the density above the threshold and reassigned them to
the left hand side of the threshold. To simulate the extreme case that workers with long potential
nonemployment spells selectively deferred ﬁling claims in order to receive higher UI durations, we
purposefully reallocated those workers with the highest nonemployment durations in our sample.
This provided very conservative lower bounds of the treatment effect. We used a symmetrical
approach to obtain upper bounds of the effect (assuming the excess mass is selected based on
shorter nonemployment durations). As further discussed below, this exercise yielded relatively
tight bounds and hence conﬁrmed that even extreme effects of selection would not overturn our
results.
Overall, since the magnitude of the change in the density is very small (in particular relative
to the size of our nonemployment results) and there are essentially no discontinuities in other
variables we do not think this is a threat to the validity of our main estimates. As a robustness
check, we estimated all our main results below, excluding observations within one month of the
cutoffs (Web Appendix Tables W-2 and W-3). This has virtually no effect on the magnitude of
the coefﬁcient at age 42 and a very small effect on the other two coefﬁcients. Furthermore we
estimated our main speciﬁcations controlling for observables, and again obtained virtually the
same coefﬁcients.
17IV THE EFFECT OF UI EXTENSIONS ON LABOR SUPPLY OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE
IV.A The Average Effect of Large Extensions of UI Durations
Our ﬁrst set of results pertain to the effect of large increases in potential UI duration on actual
take-up of UI and labor supply pooled over all years. Of interest in their own right, these ﬁnd-
ings provide a benchmark for our main analysis and interpretation of differences in the effect of
UI extensions over the business cycle. Our main ﬁnding is that the labor supply effects of poten-
tial UI duration implied by our regression discontinuity estimates are modest, similar across age
thresholds, smaller than the response of actual durations of UI beneﬁts, and consistent with the
theoretical model outlined in Section II.
Figure III (a) shows how the duration of UI receipt varies with age at the beginning of the
unemployment spell. The ﬁgure implies that a large number of individuals are substantially af-
fected by the increase in potential UI durations. Workers younger than 42 when claiming UI are
eligible to 12 months of UI beneﬁts, of which they use an average of 6.7 months. At the 42-year
threshold, UI eligibility increases to 18 months and the average duration or UI receipt increases
to about 8.5 months. The increases in beneﬁt receipt duration at the other cutoffs are also quite
substantial. They range from one fourth (at the 44-year cutoff) to one third (at the 49-year cut-
off) of the increase in the maximum UI durations. The effects of the large UI extensions at the
age thresholds on nonemployment durations are shown in Figure III (b). There is a clear jump in
nonemployment durations at the age 42 cutoff from about 15.6 to 16.4 months of nonemployment.
At age 44, nonemployment durations increase from 16.5 to 16.9 months and, at age 49, from 19.9
to 20.3. Thus, visual evidence suggests that the UI extensions lead to signiﬁcant increases in both
coverage and nonemployment durations at all thresholds.
The marginal effects obtained by estimating equation (4) separately for each age cutoff are
shown in Table II. Our main regression results in column (1) are consistent with the graphical
analysis. As shown in Panel (b), at the age 42 cutoff, nonemployment durations increase by 0.78
months (standard error 0.1 ), at age 44, the increase is 0.41 months, and at age 49, the increase is
180.43 months.12 To account for the fact that increases in UI durations differ across thresholds, one
can consider the marginal effects of an increase of a single month of UI. These effects are shown in
boldinthetableandareinthesameballparkacrossagegroups(0.13, 0.10, and0.11forages42, 44,
and 49, respectively). This suggests that, for each month of additional UI, affected workers spend
three more days in nonemployment. An alternative approach to make the estimates comparable
is to follow Meyer (2002) and calculate corresponding labor-supply elasticities. Despite the fact
that the increases in UI occur at different levels of nonemployment and UI durations, the implied
elasticities are nearly the same for the different cutoffs. They range between 0.12 and 0.13 (see
Appendix Table W-5).
After the reform of the UI system, the eligibility thresholds for extended UI were shifted to
ages 45 and 47 starting in 1999. Figure IV shows that the basic results still hold in the post-1999
regime. The discontinuities in nonemployment durations move to the new age thresholds, conﬁrm-
ing the assumptions implicit in our main analysis. Estimates of labor supply effects of potential UI
duration (shown in Web Appendix Table W-7) are now somewhat smaller than our main ﬁndings,
but of the same order of magnitude and still similar across age groups. This reduction may partly
be due to stricter monitoring of job search behavior and penalties for not accepting suitable jobs in
the new regime. When we investigate the cyclical variation of the effects of UI in the next section
we will control for this slight shift in the level of the effects.13
Our ﬁndings imply that extensions in potential UI durations lead to a signiﬁcant rise in the
duration of nonemployment. They also suggest thatactual UI durations respond morestrongly than
nonemployment durations. For each additional month of potential UI beneﬁt duration, Table II
implies that, on average, individuals remain on UI beneﬁts for 9 to 12 additional days, but in
12Since our main source of variation is not at the individual level but effectively at the time relative to the age
threshold, we cluster our standard errors by days relative to the threshold to correct our degrees of freedom. This
also allows for random speciﬁcation errors due to the introduction of discrete bins (Lee and Card 2008). Choosing
alternative dimensions of clustering does not affect the precision of our results.
13From Figure IV it is also apparent that the duration of the average unemployment spell decreased for each age.
Besides being a result from stricter monitoring, this might also be driven by an increasing incidence of temporary
low-wage jobs over this time period. Yet, the coefﬁcient on the dummy for the post-1999 period in our regression
model of the annual effects of UI extensions in Section IV.B is not statistically signiﬁcant. Appendix Figure W-2 also
shows a more visible increase in the density in the two age weeks at the two age cutoff points. Yet, the same arguments
as in Section III.D apply.
19nonemploymentfor onlyanadditional threedays. Thismeans thatasigniﬁcant fraction ofworkers
remain in nonemployment at beneﬁt exhaustion and are thus directly beneﬁting from an extension
of potential UI durations. For example, about 28 percent of unemployed individuals in our analysis
sample to the left of the age 42 cutoff, i.e. with 12 months of potential durations, exhaust their UI
beneﬁts (Web Appendix Figures W-3). An analysis of the hazard function reveals that among
exhaustees, only eight percent return to employment, while the majority enter nonemployment
(Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007b).
An analysis of the hazard function also shows that the nonemployment effect we ﬁnd is not
purely due to an outward shift of the spike at the beneﬁt exhaustion point. Figure V displays non-
parametric regression discontinuity estimates of the hazard of exiting nonemployment by duration
for individuals with 12 and 18 months of potential UI beneﬁts. Consistent with previous studies
(Meyer 2002), the Figure shows clear spikes in the hazard rate at the beneﬁt exhaustion points for
the two respective groups. However, there are also clear and statistically signiﬁcant differences
well before the exhaustion point, indicating that when eligible for longer durations, unemployed
individuals adjust their search behavior substantially in advance of exhausting their UI beneﬁts
(Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007a). These ﬁndings imply that our main effects reported in Table II
are averages of behavioral responses along the entire duration distribution.
To benchmark the potential bias from sorting of individuals at the age thresholds, we computed
upper and lower bounds for the employment effects using the method described in Section III.D.
The bounds are relatively narrow, with both lower and upper bounds statistically signiﬁcantly
different from zero. For the rescaled marginal effect of actual UI durations at the age 42 threshold,
the lower bound is estimated as 0.29, while the upper bound is 0.32. For the nonemployment
effects, the bounds are 0.095 and 0.17, respectively - well within the overall range of our estimates
in Table II. Given that the economic incentives to wait are stronger for individuals with longer
nonemployment duration, the true effect most likely lies between the main estimate and the lower
bound. The bounds for the other age thresholds are similar and are reported in the Web Appendix
(Table W-4).
20Restriction on Labor Force Participation. To examine whether our main ﬁndings are affected
by our focus on stable workers we replicated our main RD estimates without any restriction on
labor force attachment before UI receipt. According to the law, for the full sample, potential UI
durationsincreasebetweentwoandsixmonthsattheagethresholds, dependingontheemployment
history. The unrestricted sample’s RD estimates for duration of UI receipt and nonemployment ,
shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table III, are smaller than the main sample’s . Since the average
changes in potential UI durations at the thresholds are also smaller, this is consistent with the
underlying true marginal effects being similar. As explained in Section III, we cannot calculate
a rescaled marginal effect for a single month of UI extension for this group. In order to obtain a
measure comparable across samples, using the estimates in Table II and III we can normalize our
estimates of the effect of UI extensions on nonemployment duration by dividing by the effect on
actual UI duration. As discussed in Section II, this ratio is effectively an IV estimator of the effect
of UI duration on nonemployment. This ratio is quite similar for both our main sample and the
unrestricted sample.
Discussion. Our results are consistent with the theoretical model we discussed in Section
II. The model predicts that a rise in the potential duration of UI beneﬁts encourages individuals
to lower their search effort (st). Consistent with our ﬁnding in Table II, this implies a rise in
the average duration of nonemployment. Also consistent with our results, the reduction in search
intensity predicts a lower hazard of leaving unemployment for all nonemployment durations before
beneﬁt exhaustion. Our ﬁnding that the mean duration of UI receipt increases more strongly than
the nonemployment duration implies that the increase in UI coverage is only partly explained by
a behavioral response. An important part of increased coverage is due to individuals who would
otherwise have exhausted beneﬁts while remaining in nonemployment continuing to receive UI
beneﬁts. Our model provides a framework for the interpretation of the effects of UI extensions on
nonemployment and beneﬁt duration, and its implications are taken up again in Section IV.B and
the Conclusion.
The labor supply responses we ﬁnd are consistent with the results from previous studies in
21Germany, Austria, and, with some caveats, the United States. Hunt (1995) evaluates the reforms
in the German UI system over the period 1983 to 1988 using a difference-in-difference approach
between age-groups over time. Hunt (1995) ﬁnds that her estimated effect on the hazard rate is
slightly smaller than the effect in Mofﬁtt (1985), who reports a marginal effect of 0.16 weeks
per additional week of potential UI beneﬁts. This implies the estimates are quite comparable
despite differences in underlying samples, methodology, and measures of nonemployment dura-
tion.14 Lalive (2008) evaluates the effects of UI in Austria in a RD design that is similar to ours.
He ﬁnds that an increase of beneﬁt durations from 30 to 209 weeks for workers age 50 increases
unemployment durations for men from 13 to 28 weeks. This implies an increase in 0.09 months
of nonemployment for each additional month of UI duration. In a different context, Card, Chetty,
and Weber (2007a) analyze increases in beneﬁt durations in the Austrian UI system using a similar
RD design as ours but with smaller increases in potential UI durations. Their estimates point to
similarly modest labor supply effects of potential UI durations.
The marginal effects of an additional month of potential UI beneﬁts implied by our estimates
arealso ina similar range, as wasfoundin studiesexaminingthe UnitedStates. Ourmainestimates
of a marginal effect of around 0.1 - 0.13 are at the lower bound of United States estimates of the
effect of UI durations on labor supply surveyed in Meyer (2002). The most comparable study
to ours, Card and Levine (2000), ﬁnds similarly modest effects of exogenous extensions in UI
beneﬁts. Other studies tend to ﬁnd somewhat larger estimates (Meyer 1990, Katz and Meyer 1990).
To what extent these differences could be explained by the German institutional environment will
be discussed further in Section V.B.
14Since Hunt’s approach averages over different potential UI durations, a direct comparison with our estimates via
marginal effects or elasticities is difﬁcult. Another paper analyzing the age-thresholds of the German UI system using
difference-in-differences, Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010), focuses on age groups older than 50, which we excluded
from our analysis. Note that with ﬂexible controls for age, difference-in-difference estimates would be equal to RD
estimates in our case, hence we do not pursue a direct comparison between these approaches. Caliendo, Tatsiramos,
and Uhlendorf (2009) use similar data as we do from 2001-2007 to study the effect of UI extensions on job quality,
but focus on individuals close to beneﬁt exhaustion at one age threshold.
22IV.B Variation of Labor Supply Effects with the Business Cycle
A key advantage of the institutional setting in Germany is that it provides quasi-experimental in-
creases in potential UI duration that do not vary with the business cycle. This allows us to study
variation in the effects of UI over the business cycle while holding constant potentially confound-
ing labor market conditions. Using the large samples in our data, we replicated the regression
discontinuity estimates for the multiple age thresholds for each year and major industry, and ex-
amined whether the resulting labor supply effects and beneﬁt durations varied systematically with
the business cycle. To do so, we could have in principle regressed the marginal effects on business
cycle indicators for the entire period during which individuals chose their search intensity, includ-
ing at the moment of beneﬁt exhaustion. Due to high inter-temporal correlations of unemployment
rates this is, however, not feasible. Instead, we include a single indicator of the state of the business
cycle in our regressions. After some experimentation, as further discussed below, we have settled
on a common subset of measures capturing the current state of the labor market and the rate of new
inﬂows in the ﬁrst year of a worker’s UI spell.15
Overall, the ﬁndings from this exercise suggest that the nonemployment effects of potential UI
durations are quite stable over the business cycle. At best, some of our results indicate a weak
decline in the effect of extended UI on nonemployment in recessions. In contrast, the effect of UI
extensions on beneﬁt duration, and thus the additional coverage provided, increases signiﬁcantly in
recessions, mainly driven by a rise in the exhaustion rate. As a result, the nonemployment response
to actual UI durations is clearly countercyclical.
The ﬁrst panel of Figure VI plots the rescaled marginal effects of a one-month increase in
potential UI on nonemployment duration over time. The estimates are obtained by replicating the
RD estimates separately for each calendar year for the threshold at age 42 (and age 45, after the
1999 reform). This yields the most precise estimates for the effects. The unemployment rate shows
15Anotherjustiﬁcationforthis’reduced-form’approachisthatfromthepolicymaker’spointofview, whatmattersis
to optimally predict the exhaustion rate and nonemployment effect based on the current state (and predicted evolution)
of the economy, not to estimate the full underlying behavioral relationship. Given the timing and duration of UI spells
in our sample, measures of future levels and changes in unemployment rates would also capture well the economic
environment during which workers make choices. These results are quite similar and available in the Web Appendix.
23how the German economy exhibited large economic swings during the sample period, such as the
dramatic boom-bust period after uniﬁcation, plus an ensuing, protracted slump. Yet, while there is
some variation of the estimated marginal effect over time, there appears to be no clear systematic
variation with the business cycle. In the ﬁrst panel of Figure VII we investigate this further by
plotting the marginal effect for all ages against the change in the unemployment rate from t-1 to t,
where t is the year in which the UI spell starts. As discussed below, the change captures the ﬂow of
newly unemployed, and is an alternative measure of the state of the labor market. There is a slight
negative correlation, but overall the marginal effect appears to be quite stable over the business
cycle.
The ﬁndings from Figure VII (a) are extended and conﬁrmed in column (2) of Table IV. The
ﬁrst four rows of the table show results from regressing the rescaled marginal effects obtained
from separate RD estimates for each year and age group on different indicators of the change in
economic conditions. The ﬁrst row shows that when we use a standard measure of the state of
the business cycle – GDP growth – there is a positive, albeit statistically insigniﬁcant correlation
between the labor-supply effect of UI extensions and the business cycle, indicating that the disin-
centive effect tends to fall when the economy contracts. The second row uses unemployment as a
more direct measure of the state of the labor market, and ﬁnds a negative effect, also implying that
the labor supply effect declines in recessions. Although relative to the mean labor supply effect
of 0.1, a rise in the unemployment rate of two standard-deviations (column 1) would lead to a
non-negligible decline in the effect, this is not quite statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. One
concern with using the level of the unemployment rate is that its variation may be partly driven by
the stock of long-term unemployed, thus its representation of labor market conditions for newly
unemployed workers would be imperfect. Hence, the next two rows shows two measures of the
inﬂow rate into unemployment. Row 3 shows the ﬁndings when we use the change in the unem-
ployment rate as the main independent variable, whereas row 4 shows the annual mass-layoff rate
at the establishment level,(Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender 2009). Again the results indicate
a negative relationship between the state of the labor market and the effect of UI extensions on
24nonemployment duration of somewhat smaller size than the unemployment rate, but the coefﬁ-
cients are imprecisely estimated.
One concern with these estimates might be that they are purely based on the time-series varia-
tion in economic conditions shown in Figure VI (a). Hence, in the ﬁnal two rows we show changes
in labor supply elasticities for workers losing their jobs in broad industries with high or low rates
of job destruction or with high or low average wage losses in their two-digit industry (as indicated
by quintiles of average industry wage loss). The job destruction rate at the industry level provides a
measure of inﬂow. The average wage loss can be used as a proxy for the amount of speciﬁc skill a
laid-off worker is likely to lose. This is interesting because the theory predicts unemployed work-
ers facing higher wage losses should respond more strongly to beneﬁt extensions. When working
at the industry level, we control changes in overall labor demand by introducing year ﬁxed effects.
The results suggest there is little signiﬁcant difference in the effect of UI on nonemployment with
our measures of industry-speciﬁc economic conditions.
Figure VI (b), Figure VII (b) and Table IV replicate the same analysis for the effect of potential
duration of UI beneﬁts on the actual duration of UI beneﬁts. Contrary to our previous ﬁndings, it
now appears that the effect on actual UI durations is signiﬁcantly countercyclical. The lower panel
of Figure VI clearly shows how there is a substantial positive relationship between the effect of UI
extensions and beneﬁt duration and the lead in unemployment rates. As we will see below, this
correlation is driven by the cyclicality in the UI exhaustion rate. Given potential beneﬁt durations
in our sample, it is the state of the labor market in years t+1 or t+2 that matters. The lower panel
of Figure VII shows that there is a positive correlation between the change in the unemployment
rate (which captures a rise in the inﬂow to unemployment), and actual UI beneﬁt duration. This
is not surprising, since, given a high auto-correlation of unemployment rates and relatively long
unemployment durations in Germany, there is a likewise strong correlation between current inﬂows
and the future level unemployment.
These graphical ﬁndings are conﬁrmed in column (3) of Table IV, where we assess the cor-
relation of the response in UI duration to beneﬁt extensions using the same range of alternative
25business cycle measures as we did for the nonemployment effect. The table shows that the effect
of UI extensions on beneﬁt duration tends to increase in recessions. The effect correlates strongly
with the change in unemployment rates, the mass-layoff rate, or our industry-speciﬁc measures of
labor market conditions. For these measures, a rise of two-standard deviations leads to increases
in the marginal effect of about 25 to 30 percent relative to the mean. While GDP growth has a
smaller, insigniﬁcant effect, the effect of the level of the unemployment rate is of the wrong sign.
Given the evidence in Figure VI (b), it is likely that the reason is that the unemployment rate when
entering unemployment correlates only weakly with the labor market conditions at UI exhaustion.
That the cyclicality of the UI exhaustion rate is a key driver of the cyclicality in the response of
actual beneﬁt durations to UI extensions is shown explicitly in columns (5) and (6) of Table IV.
Column (5) shows how the exhaustion rate is strongly procyclical for the measures in rows 3 to (6),
while column (6) shows that the increase in beneﬁt duration prior to the exhaustion point, which is
driven by a shift in the survivor function, varies little with the cycle.16 As further discussed below,
this has potentially important implications for the welfare impact of UI extensions.
In the theory section, we showed that the ratio of the nonemployment effect and the effect
on actual beneﬁt durations, dD=dB = dD
dP
 dB
dP , represents a summary measure of the disincentive
effect that is relevant from a welfare perspective. The ratio, which captures the effect of an actual
increase in UI beneﬁt duration on nonemployment duration, normalizes for changes in the intensity
of treatment over the business cycle, since dB
dP rises with the exhaustion rate and hence with the
number of people potentially affected by UI beneﬁt extensions. The cyclical variation of the thus
’normalized’ disincentive effect is shown in column (4) of Table IV. Unlike the marginal effect
dD
dP, this normalized disincentive effect is strongly countercyclical. Out of the six regressions, it
is statistically signiﬁcantly correlated with ﬁve measures of the business cycle. The effect of a
worsening of our measures by two-standard deviations is substantial and in the same range for all
16The nonemployment and UI survivor functions diverge somewhat, since individuals leave the UI system without




1 and increase in beneﬁt duration prior to the exhaustion point dB
dP
 
2 using the actual UI survivor functions. In
the Web Appendix, we show the survivor functions separately (Figure W-5) and explain how we can compute the








2 in this case (Figure W-6).
26measures, except for the level of the unemployment rate. However, the effect of the level of the
unemployment rate is now of the right sign.
Our main ﬁndings in Table IV are very robust and in some cases stronger when we consider
important extensions in Table V. To save space, Table V only shows the results when using the
level and change in unemployment rates as our measures of cyclical conditions, and relegate the
estimates for additional measures to the Web Appendix (Table W-15). The ﬁrst column of the
table replicates our main ﬁndings in Table IV for a bandwidth of one year. In several instances, the
negative correlation of the marginal nonemployment effect and the ratio dD
dP
 dB
dP is now stronger
and statistically signiﬁcant. It is worth noting that the nonemployment elasticity (shown for our
main estimates in column (7) of Table IV), is now also signiﬁcantly, negatively correlated with the
business cycle.17
The second column shows the lower bound discussed in Section III.D, where we reallocate
the excess mass of spells from the right to the left of the cutoff, and assign them the highest
nonemployment durations in the sample. This would be the right estimator if all these workers had
purposefully waited to gain access to longer beneﬁts because they had the longest spells. Similar
to the ﬁndings in column (1), these results tend to show somewhat stronger counter-cyclicality of
the nonemployment effect and hence the ratio. To further account for potential selection due to
voluntary quitters, who are required by law to wait 85 days before becoming eligible for UI, and
also address the issue discussed in Section III that voluntary quitters may have a stronger incentive
to wait to gain access to beneﬁts above the threshold, column (3) drops anyone waiting more than
two weeks before taking up UI beneﬁts. The estimates are very similar to the main results in
Table IV.
IfcharacteristicsofUIrecipientschangeovertimeorvarywiththebusinesscycleandtreatment
effects vary across groups, another concern could be that such changes in composition could offset
potential cyclical variation in labor supply effects of UI. We examined this possibility, and found
17This suggests that the elasticity is another possible way to rescale the marginal effect by the intensity of treatment
as suggested in Section II. However, the counter cyclicality is considerably weaker than that of the ratio dD=dB,
because the average duration of nonemployment is also determined by other factors than treatment intensity.
27it not to affect our results. We analyzed cyclical variation in two summary indices of observable
characteristics in our data, the predicted propensity to receive unemployment assistance (UA) and
the predicted post-UI wage. Overall, relative to the mean, we found, at best, very small variations
in observable characteristics with the business cycle. To nevertheless make sure these changes do
not affect our ﬁndings, we used the standard re-weighting procedure to hold the distribution of
characteristics constant across years. This is shown in column (4) of Table V and conﬁrms that
our ﬁndings are very robust to changes in characteristics of UI recipients over time or the business
cycle.
Finally, to address the concern that our ﬁndings are limited to our main sample of workers
with high employment attachment, columns (5) and (6) of Table V show results when we include
all workers, irrespective of labor market experience. As discussed in Section III.B, we cannot
calculate rescaled marginal effects for this sample. Nevertheless, the ratio of marginal effects has
the same interpretation as it did for the restricted sample. The third panel of the table shows the
results when using two- and one-year bandwidths to generate the estimates. The point estimates
for the measures in the table are somewhat smaller compared to our more restricted sample when
we use a bandwidth of two years (though identical and precisely estimated when we use the mass-
layoff rate, as shown in Web Appendix Table W-15) and quite similar and more precisely estimated
when we use a bandwidth of two years. Hence, our main results hold for a very broad sample of
unemployed individuals and are not restricted to high-attachment workers.
Overall, we conclude that our main estimates for the effect of UI durations on labor supply
do not vary strongly with the business cycle, but that the exhaustion rate, and with it the effect
on beneﬁt duration, is countercyclical. In several speciﬁcations we ﬁnd a small decrease in the
labor supply effect of UI durations in recessions, but in most instances the correlation is not statis-
tically signiﬁcantly different from zero. However, these ﬁndings show that the effect of a rise of
actual beneﬁt duration on nonemployment duration, which effectively controls for any increases
in workers ’at risk’ of being affected by extended UI durations during recessions, has a clear and
precisely-estimated countercyclical pattern.
28Discussion. To see how our empirical results relate to the theory we outlined in Section II,
it is useful to consider a slightly modiﬁed version of our main welfare formula. To express our
welfare formula fully in terms of statistics that can potentially be measured empirically we follow
Chetty (2008) and normalize equation (2) by the expected marginal utility of employed workers.















where the new term in the ﬁrst bracket is the ratio of the ’liquidity’ effect (the partial derivative
of search intensity with respect to an increase in assets in the period of UI exhaustion P) and the
’substitution’ effect ( ¶sP=¶wP, the partial derivative of search intensity with respect to the wage
in period P) of a UI extension for workers exhausting UI beneﬁts.18 Using appropriate empirical
measures of the income and substitution effects, one can assess whether, at a given duration of UI
beneﬁts, an extension would be welfare-improving. Changes in the welfare effect of extensions
in UI beneﬁt durations over the business cycle arise from variation in three main components: the
effective exhaustion rate ( dB
dP), the nonemployment effect (dD
dP), and the relative strength of the
liquidity vs. substitution effect of UI beneﬁts.
As mentioned in Section II, to relate our empirical ﬁndings to the theoretical welfare formula,
it is important to realize that what is relevant for the formula is the effective exit rate from nonem-
ployment, and hence what we labeled a general equilibrium or macro effect in Section II. Our
empirical estimates hold variation in the macroeconomic environment constant and thus obtain the
partial equilibrium or micro effect. Changes arising from the exhaustion rate (which is a mechan-
ical effect) suggest that the number of beneﬁciaries from UI extensions are rising in recessions.
Yet, as further discussed in the Conclusion, whether our empirical estimates imply that the effec-
tive nonemployment effect of UI durations, and hence the efﬁciency cost from UI extensions, also
declines during recessions requires further information.
18We have that d ˜ W0=dP  (dW0=dP)=E0;T 1v0(ce
t). The result in our second formula holds as long as, on average,
unemployment durations are short relative to lifetime employment, such that the marginal utility after unemployment
is similar to the expected marginal utility at employment in t = 0. For details see the Web Appendix Section 3.
29V ROBUSTNESS
Our main results are robust to a number of alternative speciﬁcations, which are brieﬂy summarized
in this section. Additional details are relegated to the Web Appendix.
V.A Robustness Analysis
Choice of Bandwidth. We investigated whether the choice of bandwidth for the RD estimator
affects our conclusions (Table II). Using a bandwidth of two years, the point estimates from the RD
regressions are very similar to what is implied by the graphical analysis. For smaller bandwidths,
coefﬁcients are very stable for the effects on UI durations. This is true even with bandwidths as
small as 0.5 or 0.2 years. For the nonemployment durations, the estimates are in the same ballpark
across different bandwidths, but somewhat larger for tighter bandwidths. Investigating ﬁgures with
differentbandwidthsrevealedthatthisisduetounder-smoothingforverysmallbandwidths, sothat
we have most conﬁdence in estimates with two-year bandwidths. As discussed in Section IV.B,
our estimates in column (1) of Table V also imply that our results regarding cyclicality are robust
to choosing a narrower bandwidth.
Measure of Nonemployment. We also ﬁnd that the increase in nonemployment durations is
mainly due to workers taking longer until returning to a job, not due to individuals staying out of
employment forever. In order to investigate this Table III column (4) shows the probability of ever
returning to registered employment. There is a slight drop of one percent relative to the mean of
0.77 (Appendix Table A-1) at the age 42 cutoff, and the effect is even smaller for the two other age
thresholds. Even though it is statistically signiﬁcant, the slight decline in the fraction of workers
ever returning to work accounts for a very small increase in overall nonemployment durations.
Similarly, we investigated whether our estimates are affected by the choice of our nonemployment
duration measure. For example, as an alternative, we replicated all of our ﬁndings with time-to-
next-job for workers who return to employment. Consistent with the result that the incidence of
censoring does not vary strongly at the eligibility thresholds, our results are largely unaffected by
30this choice.19
Differences by Subgroups. To further examine the robustness of our main estimates, we esti-
mated the labor supply effects for several subgroups. The labor supply effects are slightly larger
but not signiﬁcantly different for highly educated and high-tenure workers, and larger and sig-
niﬁcantly different for women (See Web Appendix). While we found some small differences in
the labor supply response to UI extensions, overall the labor supply effects are remarkably robust
throughout the population.
Robustness of Differences over Cycle. We estimated many additional speciﬁcations to those
reported in Section IV.B to further investigate the robustness of the ﬁndings regarding the cyclical
variation of the effect of UI extensions. For example, dropping UI spells from East Germany from
our sample, or excluding temporary lay-offs (workers who return to their old employer), did not
affect the results reported in Table IV. One potential concern with our main estimates in Table IV is
that they mask differential effects over the cycle in different parts of the duration distribution. We
compared shifts in the entire hazard function across boom and bust periods in the Web Appendix
(Figure W-4), and did not ﬁnd this to be the case. We also tried several ways to further raise preci-
sion of our estimates. For example, when we split our sample by worsening and improving labor
market conditions, the labor supply effect seemed to decrease in worsening times (Web Appendix
Table W-10). Alternatively, we estimated a cox-proportional hazard model in the spirit of Meyer
(1990) and found a slight decline in the predicted labor supply elasticities when unemployment
was increasing (Web Appendix Table W-11). We also estimated linear and log-linear models that
pooled the effect of UI extensions across our different age-thresholds while ﬂexibly controlling
for age (Web Appendix Table W-12). Again, the changes over time were relatively small, with,
at best, weakly negative coefﬁcients on the interaction of potential UI duration and business cycle
indicators.
19Web Appendix Table W-5 provides a summary of the various steps in the sensitivity analysis, such as using
different censoring rules. See Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007b) for further discussion of alternative measures of
unemployment spells.
31V.B The Role of Unemployment Assistance
In this section we discuss to what extent our results may be affected by relatively generous UI
replacement rates and by the presence of unemployment assistance (UA). On the one hand, basic
search theory predicts that that our relatively modest effects would over-predict the effect relative
to a system with lower replacement rates. On the other hand, the presence of UA after exhaustion
of UI beneﬁts should lead to smaller effects, since the strength of the disincentive effect of UI
depends on the net change in replacement rates at exhaustion. In this context, the fact that women
have only somewhat higher responses than men is interesting, since, as discussed in Section III,
for the typical married woman with a working husband (which is a majority in our age-range) the
beneﬁt provided by UA after exhaustion of UI beneﬁts is close to zero. This suggests that the
presence of UA per se may not strongly affect our estimates.
To learn more about the potential role of extended UA in explaining our ﬁndings, we replicated
our main regression discontinuity estimates for individuals with high and low propensities to re-
ceive UA. If our main estimates were primarily driven by individuals entering UA after exhausting
beneﬁts, we should see signiﬁcant disparities here. About 10 to 15 percent of UI beneﬁciaries
and 50 percent of exhaustees receive UA. For each UI recipient in our sample, we predicted the
propensity to receive UA based on education, demographic characteristics, and their earnings his-
tories.20 As reported in Web Appendix Table W-18, the rescaled marginal effect for individuals
whose propensity is above and below 0.5 is 0.1 and 0.18, respectively (the proportion of workers
with with low propensity is about 30 percent). If we include an interaction with the individual
propensity and extrapolate linearly, for individuals with propensity of receiving UA close to 80
percent, the rescaled marginal effect is below 0.05. Yet, even for those whose propensity is 20
percent, it is 0.25, well within the overall magnitude of our main ﬁndings. Thus, we conclude that
while individuals seem to respond to the incentives inherent in UA, and hence the presence of UA
may lead to somewhat smaller overall estimates, it is unlikely to be the main source behind the
20The corresponding linear probability model is shown in the Web Appendix Table W-9, and suggests our speciﬁ-
cation has a good ﬁt. The average predicted value for the probability of take up of UA at exhaustion for the full sample
is 0.54, which can be thought of as an estimate of the fraction of UI recipients who are potentially eligible for UA..
32labor supply effects we ﬁnd.
VI CONCLUSION
In this paper, we estimate how the effect of extensions in the duration of unemployment insurance
beneﬁts (UI) on nonemployment and beneﬁt duration varies over the business cycle. To do so, we
use the universe of unemployment spells in Germany over 20 years, where differences in potential
UI durations by age allow for the implementation of a regression discontinuity design. Since
the age discontinuities do not vary with economic conditions, they provide multiple, valid quasi-
experiments throughout the business cycle, allowing us to avoid endogeneity problems arising
when parameters of UI respond to the economic conditions. Our ﬁndings indicate a modest effect
of a one-month extension in UI durations on nonemployment durations of comparable magnitude
to what has been found before. This effect is quite stable over different economic environments.
At best, some speciﬁcations point to slightly smaller nonemployment effects during recessions.
On the other hand, we ﬁnd that the additional coverage provided by UI extensions is strongly
increasing in recessions, mainly due to a sharp increase of the fraction unemployed who otherwise
would have exhausted their UI beneﬁts. As a result, the ratio of the effect of UI extensions on
nonemployment and beneﬁt durations – which captures the reduction in nonemployment duration
for a given rise in UI durations, and hence is a measure of the disincentive effect – is signiﬁcantly
counter-cyclical.
To help interpret these ﬁndings, we show, in a search model with liquidity constraints, that
the welfare effect of UI extensions is the sum of two components: the beneﬁt provided by the
additional coverage for individuals who otherwise would have exhausted UI beneﬁts, and the cost
due to the nonemployment effect of UI, which leads to an increased tax burden for the employed.
This result clariﬁes the notion that the optimal duration of UI beneﬁts does not only depend on the
the exhaustion rate (Corson and Nicholson 1982) or on the nonemployment effect (Mofﬁtt 1985)
alone, but on both. The welfare gain from UI extensions can be expressed as a function of the
ratio of the effect of UI extensions on nonemployment and beneﬁt durations. As in prior, related
33literature on UI beneﬁt levels, a decline in this ratio and hence a reduction in the effective moral
hazard of UI extensions ceteris paribus raises the optimal duration of UI beneﬁts.
The welfare formula that we derive from our model, together with our ﬁndings of weakly-
declining nonemployment effects and strongly countercyclical exhaustion rates, implies that the
optimal duration of UI beneﬁts should rise in recessions under two conditions. First, if the marginal
utility of the unemployed is constant or increasing during recessions. Second, if the cyclical move-
ment of the partial equilibrium effects identiﬁed in this paper provide a good approximation of
the cyclicality of general equilibrium effects. In this case, our results also suggest that countries
with constant UI durations over the business cycle, such as Germany and most other European
countries, may raise welfare by moving to a system with countercyclical potential UI durations.
Whether these conditions hold are empirical questions beyond the scope of this paper. For
example, a reduction in the ability to self-insure through a decline in wealth in recessions would
lead to a rise in the marginal utility of consumption of the unemployed and thus in the value of
insurance. Existing evidence from the United States suggests that this ’liquidity’ effect does not
appear to vary signiﬁcantly with the business cycle. A bigger challenge, both theoretically as well
as empirically, is that UI extensions may affect nonemployment durations by affecting the overall
state of the labor market. In the presence of search externalities, if there is incomplete take-up of
UI beneﬁts, if UI extensions raise aggregate demand, or if recessions involve job rationing (as in
the model of Landais, Michaillat, and Saez 2010), then our partial equilibrium effects represent
a lower bound of the efﬁciency cost of UI. If, on the other hand, recessions involve the need for
reallocation (as in Ljungqvist and Sargent 1998) or if UI extensions reduce the incentives to create
vacancies, then our estimates may represent upper bounds.
34REFERENCES
Andersen, Torben M. and Michael Svarer, “State Dependent Unemployment Beneﬁts,” Journal
of Risk and Insurance, 78 (2), (2010), 325–344.
Angrist, Joshua D. and Guido W. Imbens, “Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation of Average
Causal Effects in Models with Variable Treatment Intensity,” Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 90 (430), (1995), 431–442.
Arntz, Melanie, Simon Lo, and Ralf A. Wilke, “Bounds Analysis of Competing Risks: A
Nonparametric Evaluation of the Effect of Unemployment Beneﬁts on Imigration in Germany,”
ZEW Discussion Papers, 07-049 (2007).
Baily, Martin N., “Some Aspects of Optimal Unemployment Insurance,” Journal of Public
Economics, 10 (December), (1978), 379–402.
Browning, Martin and Thomas F. Crossley, “Unemployment insurance beneﬁt levels and
consumption changes,” Journal of Public Economics, 80 (1), (2001), 1–23.
Caliendo, Marco, Konstantinos Tatsiramos, and Arne Uhlendorff, “Beneﬁt Duration,
Unemployment Duration and Job Match Quality: A Regression-Discontinuity Approach,” IZA
Discussion Paper, 4670 (2009).
Card, David and Phillip B. Levine, “Extended beneﬁts and the duration of UI spells: evidence
from the New Jersey extended beneﬁt program,” Journal of Public Economics, 78 (1-2),
(2000), 107–138.
, Raj Chetty, and Andrea Weber, “Cash-On-Hand and Competing Models of Intertemporal
Behavior: New Evidence from the Labor Market,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 (4),
(2007a), 1511–1560.
, , and , “The spike at beneﬁt exhaustion: Leaving the unemployment system or starting a
new job?,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 97 (2), (2007b), 113–118.
Chetty, Raj, “Moral hazard versus liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance,” Journal of
political Economy, 116 (2), (2008), 173–234.
Corson, Walter and Walter Nicholson, The Federal Supplemental Beneﬁts Program: An
Appraisal of Emergency Extended Unemployment Insurance Beneﬁts, Kalamazoo, MI: W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, (1982).
Fitzenberger, Bernd and Ralf A. Wilke, “Unemployment Durations in West Germany Before and
After the Reform of the Unemployment Compensation System During the 1980s,” German
Economic Review, 11 (3), (2010), 336–366.
Fortin, Nicole, John DiNardo, and Thomas Lemieux, “Labor Market Institutions and the
Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach,” Econometrica, 64 (5),
(1997), 1001–44.
Gruber, Jonathan, “The consumption smoothing beneﬁts of unemployment insurance,” The
American Economic Review, 87 (1), (1997), 192–205.
Hopenhayn, Hugo A. and Juan P. Nicolini, “Optimal Unemployment Insurance,” Journal of
Political Economy, 105 (2), (1997), 412–438.
Hunt, Jennifer, “The Effect of Unemployment Compensation on Unemployment Duration in
Germany,” Journal of Labor Economics, 13 (1), (1995), 88–120.
Katz, Lawrence and Bruce D. Meyer, “The Impact of Potential Duration of Unemployment
Beneﬁts on the Duration of Unemployment Outcomes,” Journal of Public Economics, (1990),
45–71.
35Kiley, Michael T., “How Should Unemployment Beneﬁts Respond to the Business Cycle?,” The
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, (1), (2003).
Kroft, Kory and Matt J. Notowidigdo, “Should Unemployment Insurance Vary With the Local
Unemployment Rate? Theory and Evidence,” mimeo, (2010).
Krueger, Alan B. and Bruce D. Meyer, “Labor supply effects of social insurance,” Handbook of
public economics, 4 (2002), 2327–2392.
Lalive, Rafael, “How do extended beneﬁts affect unemployment duration? A regression
discontinuity approach,” Journal of Econometrics, 142 (2), (2008), 785–806.
Landais, Camille, Pascal Michaillat, and Emmanuel Saez, “Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Over the Business Cycle,” NBER Working Paper, 16526 (2010).
Lee, David S. and David Card, “Regression discontinuity inference with speciﬁcation error,”
Journal of Econometrics, 142 (2), (2008), 655–674.
and Thomas Lemieux, “Regression discontinuity designs in economics,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 48 (2), (2010), 281–355.
Lentz, Rasmus and Torben Tranaes, “Job Search and Savings: Wealth Effects and Duration
Dependence,” Journal of Labor Economics, 23 (July), (2005), 467–489.
Ljungqvist, Lars and Thomas J. Sargent, “The European unemployment dilemma,” Journal of
Political Economy, 106 (3), (1998), 514–550.
and , “Two Questions about European Unemployment,” Econometrica, 76 (1), (2008),
1–29.
McCrary, Justin, “Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A
density test,” Journal of Econometrics, 142 (2), (2008), 698–714.
Meyer, Bruce D., “Unemployment Duration and Unemployment Spells,” Econometrica, 58
(1990), 757–82.
, “Unemployment and workers compensation programmes: rationale, design, labour supply
and income support,” Fiscal Studies, 23 (1), (2002), 1–49.
Mofﬁtt, Robert, “Unemployment Insurance and the Distribution of Unemployment Spells,”
Journal of Econometrics, 28 (1), (1985), 85–101.
Needels, Karen and Walter Nicholson, “Extended Unemployment Beneﬁts: A Review of the
Literature,” mimeo, (2004).
Pavoni, Nicola, “On Optimal Unemployment Compensation,” Journal of Monetary Economics,
54 (2007), 1612–1630.
Rothstein, Jesse, “Unemployment Insurance and Job Search in the Great Recession,” Mimeo,
University of California, Berkeley, (2011).
Sanchez, Juan M., “Optimal state-contingent unemployment insurance,” Economics Letters, 98
(2008), 348 – 357.
Schmieder, Johannes F., Till von Wachter, and Stefan Bender, “The Long-Term Impact of Job
Displacement in Germany During the 1982 Recession on Earnings, Income, and Employment,”
Columbia University, Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series, DP0910-07 (2009).
Shimer, Robert and Ivan Werning, “Reservation Wages and Unemployment Insurance,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 (3), (2007), 1145–1185.
Solon, Gary, “Labor Supply Effects of Extended Unemployment Beneﬁts,” Journal of Human
Resources, 14 (1979), 247–255.
von Wachter, Till, Jae Song, and Joyce Manchester, “Long-Term Earnings Losses due to
Mass-Layoffs During the 1982 Recession: An Analysis Using Longitudinal Administrative
36Data from 1974 to 2004,” mimeo, (2011).
Štˇ epán Jurajda and Frederick J. Tannery, “Unemployment Durations and Extended
Unemployment Beneﬁts in Local Labor Markets,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56
(2), (2003), 324–348.
Wilke, Ralf A., “New Estimates of the Duration and Risk of Unemployment for West-Germany,”
Journal of Applied Social Science Studies, 128 (2), (2005), 207–237.
37Tables
Table I: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Smoothness of Predetermined Variables
around Age Discontinuities in Potential Duration of Unemployment Insurance (UI) Ben-
eﬁts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Years of Female Foreign Tenure Occupation Industry Wage
Education Citizen Last Job Tenure Tenure Last Job
Last Job Last Job
D(age>=42) 0.027 0.0056 0.0023 -0.010 -0.038 -0.017 0.28
[0.014] [0.0028]* [0.0021] [0.028] [0.036] [0.016] [0.21]
Observations 452749 452749 452749 452749 452749 452749 418667
D(age>=44) -0.0092 0.00016 -0.00088 -0.045 -0.052 -0.023 0.078
[0.013] [0.0028] [0.0024] [0.029] [0.037] [0.017] [0.20]
Observations 450280 450280 450280 450280 450280 450280 413874
D(age>=49) 0.026 0.010 -0.000038 -0.0072 -0.070 -0.011 -0.12
[0.014] [0.0036]** [0.0034] [0.034] [0.045] [0.021] [0.26]
Observations 329680 329680 329680 329680 329680 329680 292706
Notes: The coefﬁcients estimate the magnitude of the change in the dependent variable at each age thresh-
old. Each coefﬁcient is estimated in a separate RD regression that controls linearly for age using different
slopes on each side of the cutoff and bandwidth of two age years. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the day level (* P<.05, ** P<.01).
The sample consists of individuals starting unemployment spells between July 1987 and March 1999, who
had worked for at least 52 months in the last 7 years without intermittent UI spell. Last job refers to the
last job prior to starting the unemployment insurance spell. Means are shown in Appendix Table A-1.
38Table II: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Potential Unemployment Insurance
(UI) Beneﬁt Duration (P) on Months of Actual UI Beneﬁt Receipt and Months of
Nonemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age bandwidth around age discontinuity
2 years 1 year 0.5 years 0.2 years
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Duration of UI Beneﬁt receipt (B)
D(age>=42) 1.78 1.82 1.73 1.65
[0.036]** [0.052]** [0.072]** [0.11]**
Effect of 1 add. Month of Beneﬁts dB
dP 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.28
Observations 452749 225774 112436 45301
D(age>=44) 1.04 1.16 1.13 1.24
[0.047]** [0.065]** [0.092]** [0.15]**
Effect of 1 add. Month of Beneﬁts dB
dP 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.31
Observations 450280 225134 112597 45258
D(age>=49) 1.40 1.44 1.44 1.72
[0.074]** [0.084]** [0.12]** [0.18]**
Effect of 1 add. Month of Beneﬁts dB
dP 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.43
Observations 329680 217942 109238 43812
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Nonemployment Duration (D)
D(age>=42) 0.78 0.92 1.04 0.79
[0.086]** [0.12]** [0.17]** [0.27]**
Effect of 1 add. Month of Beneﬁts dD
dP 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.13
Observations 452749 225774 112436 45301
D(age>=44) 0.41 0.63 0.62 0.78
[0.089]** [0.13]** [0.18]** [0.30]*
Effect of 1 add. Month of Beneﬁts dD
dP 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.20
Observations 450280 225134 112597 45258
D(age>=49) 0.43 0.52 0.56 0.79
[0.11]** [0.13]** [0.19]** [0.29]**
Effect of 1 add. Month of Beneﬁts dD
dP 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.20
Observations 329680 217942 109238 43812
Notes: The coefﬁcients estimate the magnitude of the change in beneﬁt or Nonemployment du-
ration at the age threshold. Each coefﬁcient is estimated in a separate RD regression that controls
linearly for age with different slopes on each side of cutoff. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the day level (* P<.05, ** P<.01).
At the 42-year discontinuity, potential UI beneﬁt durations (P) increase from 12 to 18 months,
at the 44-year discontinuity from 18 to 22 months and at the 49-year discontinuity from 22 to
26 months. The sample consists of individuals starting unemployment insurance spells between
July 1987 and March 1999, who had worked for at least 52 months in the last 7 years without
intermittent UI spells. For the age 49 cutoff and two-year bandwidth column, the regression only
includes individuals between 47 and 50 years of age, due to an early retirement discontinuity at
age 50.
39Table III: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect Of Potential
Unemployment Insurance (UI) Beneﬁt Duration on Additional Em-
ployment Outcomes and Estimates Based on Sample without Labor-
Force Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time until UI Duration Nonemp Duration Ever emp.
UI Claim No Exp. No Exp. again
restrictions restrictions
D(age>=42) -0.00089 0.98 0.45 -0.01
[0.020] [0.016]** [0.036]** [0.0022]**
Observations 452749 2467954 2467954 452749
D(age>=44) 0.016 0.46 0.21 -0.0056
[0.021] [0.019]** [0.036]** [0.0024]*
Observations 450280 2293865 2293865 450280
D(age>=49) -0.0027 0.76 0.40 -0.0076
[0.025] [0.032]** [0.050]** [0.0036]*
Observations 329680 1550099 1550099 329680
Notes: The coefﬁcients estimate the magnitude of the change in the dependent
variable at the age threshold. Each coefﬁcient is estimated in a separate regres-
sion discontinuity model that controls linearly for age with different slopes and
bandwidth of two age years on each side of cutoff. Standard errors (in parenthe-
ses) are clustered at the day level (* P<.05, ** P<.01).
The sample for columns (1) and (4) consists of individuals starting unemploy-
ment spells between July 1987 and March 1999, who had worked for at least 52
months in the last 7 years without intermittent UI spell. The sample for columns
(2) and (3) consists of all individuals starting unemployment spells between July
1987 and March 1999 without restriction on employment history or UI receipt
prior to the current UI spell.
40Table IV: The Correlation of Annual Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Extensions in UI Beneﬁt Durations on Nonemployment and
Actual Beneﬁt Duration with Alternative Measures of the Economic Environment
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean & Nonemployment UI-Beneﬁts Nonemp. Duration UI Exhaustion Rate Additional Nonemployment
Standard Duration: Duration: Marg. Effect (Additional UI Beneﬁcaries Duration
Deviation Rescaled Rescaled scaled by UI Beneﬁciaries due only to Shift of Elasticity























Dependent Variable Varies by Year and Age-Threshold
Real GDP Growth from 2.15 0.0078 -0.012 0.045 -0.011 -0.00086 0.011
Year t-1 to t [1.58] [0.0065] [0.0081] [0.023]† [0.0055]† [0.0048] [0.0071]
National Unemployment Rate 9.09 -0.0099 -0.0053 -0.032 -0.00059 -0.0047 -0.011
in Year t [1.64] [0.0063] [0.0084] [0.024] [0.0061] [0.0046] [0.0070]
Change in Unemployment Rate 0.13 -0.012 0.038 -0.10 0.029 0.0086 -0.019
from Year t-1 to t [0.78] [0.013] [0.014]* [0.042]* [0.0093]** [0.0091] [0.014]
Fraction of Establishments with 1.31 -0.022 0.059 -0.17 0.048 0.010 -0.035
Mass Layoffs in Year t [0.53] [0.020] [0.022]* [0.065]* [0.014]** [0.015] [0.022]
Dependent Variable Varies by Year and 1-digit Industry and Age-Threshold
Job Destruction Rate in 1-digit 0.090 0.52 1.39 -2.32 1.25 0.14 0.26
Industry from Period t-1 to t [0.032] [0.49] [0.28]** [1.20]† [0.17]** [0.27] [0.51]
Dependent Variable Varies by Year and Quintile of Average 2-digit Industry Wage Change and Age-Threshold
Mean Change in Log Wages within -0.047 -0.033 -0.56 0.98 -0.62 0.063 0.089
Quintile of 2-dig. Ind. Wage Change [0.079] [0.15] [0.093]** [0.47]* [0.047]** [0.089] [0.17]
Mean of Dep Var 0.10 0.28 0.36 0.44 -0.15 0.11
Notes: Stars indicate conﬁdence levels: †P<.1, * P<.05, ** P<.01.
Columns (2)-(7) report coefﬁents from a 2 step regression. In the ﬁrst step the effect of Extended UI durations on nonemployment durations are estimated separately for all years and
age thresholds using the regression discontinuity estimator. All RD marginal effects are computed using a 2 year bandwidth and control for linear age splines with different slopes
on each side of the cutoff. In the second step the resulting marginal effects (columns) are regressed on measures of the economic environment (rows). Each reported coefﬁcient
represents the coefﬁcient on those measures, given in the row names. The second step regressions also include a dummy for marginal effects measured after the 1999 reform. Standard
errors are computed to allow for a common error-component at the year level. A mass-layoff is deﬁned as a 30% drop in employment over a year. The rate is calculated among all
establishments with at least 50 employees in the baseline year. The regressions for each coefﬁcient in rows 1-4 are at the year times age threshold level and have 51 observations in
the second stage. The regressions in row 5 are at the year times age times 1-digit industry level and have 450 observations in the second stage. For the regressions in row 6 we ﬁrst
compute average wage losses of people who become unemployed at the 2 digit industry times year level. We then assign industries to quintiles of the average wage change within
each year and estimate the marginal effects at the year times age times quintile level. The second stage regresses these estimates against the average log-wage change in the quintiles
and is based on 240 observations.
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1Table V: Alternative Speciﬁcations for the Correlation of Annual Regression Discontinuity Estimates of
Extensions in UI Beneﬁt Durations on Nonemployment and Actual Beneﬁt Duration with the Economic
Environment - Smaller Bandwidth, Reweighted, Unrestricted Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bandwidth Lower Bound Sample Restr. Sample No Experience No Experience
for RD Est. for Estimates to UI take up Reweighted to Restrictions Restrictions
1 Year in RD Est. within 15 Days Characteristics Bandwidth Bandwidth
of Job Ending of Year 2000 2 Years 1 Year
Nonemp. Duration Marginal Effect: dD
dP
National Unemployment Rate -0.019 -0.011 -0.012 -0.014 – –
in Year t [0.0065]* [0.0057]† [0.0096] [0.011]
Change in Unemployment Rate -0.019 -0.022 -0.0100 -0.020 – –
from Year t-1 to t [0.015] [0.011]† [0.020] [0.022]
UI-Beneﬁt Duration Marginal Effect: dB
dP
National Unemployment Rate -0.0059 -0.0044 -0.0060 -0.0049 – –
in Year t [0.0093] [0.0087] [0.0092] [0.0090]
Change in Unemployment Rate 0.042 0.040 0.040 0.036 – –
from Year t-1 to t [0.015]* [0.014]* [0.015]* [0.015]*




National Unemployment Rate -0.059 -0.039 -0.026 -0.037 -0.00095 -0.039
in Year t [0.024]* [0.026] [0.029] [0.026] [0.027] [0.027]
Change in Unemployment Rate -0.13 -0.12 -0.099 -0.12 -0.059 -0.12
from Year t-1 to t [0.045]* [0.045]* [0.053]† [0.045]* [0.051] [0.047]*
Nonemp. Duration Elasticity : hD;P
National Unemployment Rate -0.022 -0.012 -0.015 -0.014 – –
in Year t [0.0077]* [0.0067]† [0.012] [0.0098]
Change in Unemployment Rate -0.029 -0.028 -0.021 -0.026 – –
from Year t-1 to t [0.017] [0.013]* [0.025] [0.019]
Notes: Stars indicate conﬁdence levels: †P<.1, * P<.05, ** P<.01.
The speciﬁcations correspond to the ﬁrst 4 rows in Table 4. Each coefﬁcient is from a separate regression and based on the same 2 step
method as before. The unit of observation in the second stage is the RD coefﬁcient in 51 age-threshold X year cells. Column (1) is identical
to the speciﬁcations in Table 4, but uses a 1 year bandwidth for obtaining the RD estimates. Column (2) obtains the RD estimates using the
lower bound analysis described in the text. Column (3) restricts the sample to individuals who take up UI beneﬁts within 15 days of the end
of their last job. Column (4) uses a reweighting method to keep the observable characteristics constant across all years. Columns (5) and (6)
show estimates for the full sample without any experience restrictions for one and two year bandwidths. The mean of the dependent variable
in Columns (5) and (6) is 0.46 and 0.62, respectively. Since for the unrestricted sample the actual potential beneﬁt duration is not known (but
changes in the fraction of workers with high labor-force attachment over the business cycle can lead to changes in treatment intensity and
hence to ’spurious’ variation in the regression discontinuity effects), the rows referring to rescaled marginal effects are left empty.
42Figure I: Potential Unemployment Insurance Durations by Period for Workers with High

























40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
Age
Jul 1987 − Mar 1999 Apr 1999 − Dec 2004
Notes: The ﬁgure shows how potential unemployment insurance (UI) durations vary with age and over
time for unemployed individuals workers who had worked for at least 52 months in the last 7 years without
intermittent UI spell.
43Figure II: Frequency of Spells Around Age Cutoffs for Potential Unemployment Insurance
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Age at Start of Unemployment Spell
Number UE Spells
Cellsize: 14 Days; Months worked in prev. 7 years: >= 52 and <= 72; N





































40 42 44 46 48 50
Age at Job Loss
Number UE Spells
Cellsize: 14 Days; Months worked in prev. 7 years: >= 52 and <= 72; N
(b) Age at Job Loss
Notes: The top ﬁgure shows density of spells by age at the start of receiving unemployment
insurance (i.e. the number of spells in 2 week interval age bins). The bottom ﬁgure shows
the density by age at the end of the last job before the UI spell. The vertical lines mark
age cutoffs for increases in potential UI durations at age 42 (12 to 18 months), 44 (18 to
22 months) and 49 (22 to 26 months). The sample is composed of unemployed workers
claiming UI between July 1987 and March 1999 who had worked for at least 52 months in
the last 7 years without intermittent UI spell.
44Figure III: The Effect of Potential Duration in Unemployment Insurance (UI) Beneﬁts on
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Age at Start of Unemployment Spell
Duration of ALG receipt (net)
Cellsize: 60 Days; Months worked in prev. 7 years: >= 52 and <= 72; duralgr

















40 42 44 46 48 50
Age at Start of Unemployment Spell
Nonemployment Duration in months (cap 36 Months incl. cens.)
Cellsize: 60 Days; Months worked in prev. 7 years: >= 52 and <= 72; durnonemp3
(b) Nonemployment Duration
Notes: The top ﬁgure shows average durations of receiving UI beneﬁts by age at the start
of receiving unemployment insurance. The bottom ﬁgure shows average non-employment
durations for these workers, where nonemployment duration is measured as the time until
return to a job and is capped at 36 months. Each dot corresponds to an average over 120
days. The continuous lines represent polynomials ﬁtted separately within the respective
age range. The vertical lines mark age cutoffs for increases in potential UI durations at
age 42 (12 to 18 months), 44 (18 to 22 months) and 49 (22 to 26 months). The sample is
composed of unemployed workers claiming UI between July 1987 and March 1999 who
had worked for at least 52 months in the last 7 years without intermittent UI spell.
45Figure IV: The Effect of Potential Duration in Unemployment Insurance (UI) Beneﬁts on















40 42 44 46 48 50
Age at Start of Unemployment Spell
Sample restricted to: All, Period 1999−2004
Duration of ALG receipt (net)
Cellsize: 60 Days; Months worked in prev. 7 years: >= 52 and <= 72; duralgr



















40 42 44 46 48 50
Age at Start of Unemployment Spell
Sample restricted to: All, Period 1999−2004
Nonemployment Duration in months (cap 36 Months incl. cens.)
Cellsize: 60 Days; Months worked in prev. 7 years: >= 52 and <= 72; durnonemp3
(b) Non-employment Durations
Notes: The top ﬁgure shows average durations of receiving UI beneﬁts by age at the start
of receiving unemployment insurance. The bottom ﬁgure shows average nonemployment
durations for these workers, where nonemployment duration is measured as the time until
return to a job and is capped at 36 months. Each dot corresponds to an average over 120
days. The vertical lines mark age cutoffs for increases in potential UI durations at age 45
(12 to 18 months) and 47 (18 to 22 months). The sample is composed of unemployed
workers claiming UI between April 1999 and December 2004 who had worked for at least
52 months in the last 7 years without intermittent UI spell.
46Figure V: The Effect of Increasing Potential Unemployment Insurance (UI) Durations from























0 5 10 15 20 25
Duration in Months
12 Months Potential UI Duration 18 Months Potential UI Duration
1987−1999, RD Diff Slope
Empirical Hazard
Notes: The difference between the hazard functions is estimated pointwise at each point
of support using regression discontinuity estimation. Vertical bars indicate that the hazard
rates are statistically signiﬁcant from each other at the ﬁve percent level. The sample is
composed of unemployed workers claiming UI between July 1987 and March 1999 who
had worked for at least 52 months in the last 7 years without intermittent UI spell. For
details see text and Web Appendix.
47Figure VI: Variation in Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Marginal Effects of Potential

















































1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
dD/dP  − RD Discontinuity Estimates
(a) Effect of Pot. UI Durations on Nonemployment Durations dD























































1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
dB/dP  − RD Discontinuity Estimates
(b) Effect of Pot. UI Durations on Actual UI Durations dB
dP and the Unemployment Rate
Notes: Eachdotinthe bottomﬁgurecorrespondsto arescaledmarginaleffect ofonemonth
additional potential UI duration estimated at an age cutoff in one year between 1987 and
2004 at the age 42 (before the 1999 reform) and the age 45 (after the 1999 reform) cutoff,
where pot. UI durations increased from 12 to 18 months. Since the 1999 reform occurred
during the year there are 2 estimates for 1999. The samples are described in Figures II and
IV. The line shows the German unemployment rate in each year.
48Figure VII: Variation in Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Marginal Effects of Poten-
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Change in Unemployment Rate
Correlation of dD/dP with Change in Unemployment Rate  − RD Estimates
(a) Effect of Pot. UI Durations on Nonemployment Durations dD
dP vs. Change in Unem-
ployment Rate
Age: 44
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Age: 47 Age: 45
Age: 47

























−1 0 1 2
Change in Unemployment Rate
Correlation of dB/dP with Change in Unemployment Rate  − RD Estimates
(b) Effect of Pot. UI Durations on Actual UI Durations dB
dP vs. Change in Unemployment
Rate
Notes: Eachdotinthe bottomﬁgurecorrespondsto arescaledmarginaleffect ofonemonth
additional potential UI duration estimated at an age cutoff in one year between 1987 and
2004 at any of the available cutoffs (42, 44, 45, 47, and 49). The horizontal lines are the
regression lines from a regression of the estimated marginal effects on the change in the
unemployment rate from year t-1 to t. The samples are described in Figures II and IV.
49Appendix
Table A.1: Means and Standard Deviations of Main Variables from German Social Security Data on
Unemployment Insurance (UI) Spells from 1987 to 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemp. Insurance As Column (1) As Column (1) but As Column (2) but
Spells but only Age only max pot UI only max pot UI
1987 to 2004 40 to 49 duration duration
Panel A: Unemployment Variables
Maximum UI beneﬁt duration (imputed) . . 16.0 18.0
[5.3] [4.7]
Duration of UI beneﬁt receipt in months 6.5 6.9 8.1 9.0
[6.0] [6.4] [7.2] [7.6]
Non-employment duration in months 14.5 14.7 16.7 17.3
[13.9] [13.9] [14.6] [14.5]
Duration until next job (censored 2008) 13.3 12.7 14.6 14.2
[20.1] [18.3] [22.2] [19.9]
Duration until next job if job within 36 months 8.0 8.1 8.4 8.9
[8.4] [8.4] [8.6] [8.8]
Time between end of job and UI claim 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4
[8.1] [8.3] [3.8] [3.5]
Daily Post Unemployment Wage in Euro 54.5 53.9 62.5 62.2
[26.4] [26.2] [29.0] [29.5]
Post Wage - Pre Wage in Euro -3.7 -4.4 -10.1 -11.4
[24.8] [24.3] [27.7] [27.9]
Log(Post Wage) - Log(Pre Wage) -0.067 -0.079 -0.17 -0.19
[0.48] [0.47] [0.50] [0.50]
Switch industry after unemployment 0.62 0.60 0.70 0.70
[0.49] [0.49] [0.46] [0.46]
Switch occupation after unemployment 0.56 0.55 0.62 0.62
[0.50] [0.50] [0.49] [0.49]
Ever employed again 0.85 0.84 0.78 0.77
[0.36] [0.37] [0.41] [0.42]
Non-employment spell censored at 36 months 0.23 0.23 0.30 0.31
[0.42] [0.42] [0.46] [0.46]
Next job is fulltime employment 0.84 0.83 0.89 0.89
[0.37] [0.37] [0.31] [0.31]
Log(Wage) 5 years after start of UI 4.01 3.97 4.15 4.12
[0.49] [0.48] [0.49] [0.49]
Employed 5 years after start of UI 0.38 0.36 0.41 0.38
[0.49] [0.48] [0.49] [0.49]
Unemployed 5 years after start of UI 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.11
[0.34] [0.35] [0.30] [0.32]
Panel B: Pre-Determined Variables
Daily Wage in Euro (Pre-UI for Col 2-4) 59.2 58.9 74.1 74.5
[29.4] [29.8] [32.4] [33.5]
Education years 10.9 10.8 11.0 10.9
[2.30] [2.20] [2.31] [2.32]
Female 0.42 0.43 0.35 0.34
[0.49] [0.49] [0.48] [0.47]
Non-German 0.082 0.078 0.089 0.096
[0.27] [0.27] [0.28] [0.29]
Actual experience (censored 1975) 10.7 10.6 12.2 13.5
[8.49] [8.49] [5.64] [6.15]
Years of ﬁrm tenure 2.58 2.58 6.14 6.65
[4.60] [4.60] [5.29] [5.72]
Years of occupation tenure (1-digit) 5.44 8.27 9.07 5.56
[6.28] [6.28] [5.64] [6.12]
Years of industry tenure (1-digit) 2.17 6.65 7.16 2.28
[2.71] [2.71] [5.76] [6.29]
Number of Spells 24593548 9315548 4983468 1990812
Notes: The table shows means and standard deviations (in brackets) for the main variables used in the analysis. The ﬁrst column shows
characteristics of all UI spells age 30 to 52 that started between July 1987 and December 2004 (witht the observation window running
until December 2008). The second column restricts the sample to individuals age 40 to 49. Column (3) restricts the UI sample to
individuals who have worked for at least 52 months since their last UI spell within the last 7 years without intermittent UI spell and
thus are, with certainty, eligible for the maximum potential beneﬁt durations. Column (4) restricts this sample further to Age 40 to 49,
which is the sample used in the regression analysis. Wages are in year 2000 prices.
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